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The Embedded Liberalism Compromise in the Making
of the GATT and Uruguay Round Agreements
Meredith Kolsky Lewis

This chapter examines the Embedded Liberalism Compromise in the context of
the GATT and Uruguay Round agreements. It also brieﬂy addresses possible
examples of Embedded Liberalism in the current international economic law
environment.
As an initial matter, in order to identify indicia of the Embedded Liberalism
Compromise, it is necessary, although not altogether straightforward, to try to pin
down what we mean by that phrase. The term ‘embedded liberalism’ was coined by
John Gerard Ruggie in his seminal 1982 article.1 Ruggie revisits his phrase in later
work, and others have also adopted the ‘embedded liberalism’ concept, sometimes
in ways that may not match Ruggie’s conception. The ﬁrst part of this chapter
will discuss the concept as expressed by Ruggie in his original article. The question
then arises whether the Embedded Liberalism Compromise continued beyond the
time period Ruggie discusses and, if so, in what form or forms. This necessitates
consideration of whether we should view the Compromise as having a ﬁxed
meaning based on Ruggie’s original concept or whether we should instead see the
possibility for a variety of iterations of Embedded Liberalism compromises,
depending on the social, economic and political concerns of a given time. These
issues are addressed in the second part of the chapter. The third part discusses
whether a range of GATT and Uruguay Round agreements provisions ﬁt within
Ruggie’s conception of embedded liberalism and, if not, whether they should
nonetheless be considered to be new forms of an Embedded Liberalism Compromise or as something other than Embedded Liberalism. The fourth part considers
Embedded Liberalism in the present-day context. The ﬁfth part of the chapter
concludes.

1

J. G. Ruggie, “International regimes, transactions and change: Embedded liberalism in the
postwar economic order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982).
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john gerard ruggie’s embedded liberalism compromise
In Ruggie’s original conception, embedded liberalism originated in the post-World
War Two/Bretton Woods era. At that time, the Allied Powers, particularly the
United States and the United Kingdom, viewed international economic cooperation
as an important strategy to prevent a slide back into war. This belief stemmed in part
from a concern that if the Axis Powers and other countries with damaged economies
did not see economic growth, further political instability could result. In addition,
the recession of the interwar years had occurred during a time of isolationist,
protectionist economic policies such as the notorious Smoot–Hawley tariff.2
At Bretton Woods, the Allies therefore sought to negotiate a new international
economic architecture. However, there were concerns over ensuring that increased
trade did not come at the expense of domestic stability. Thus, on the one hand,
lowering tariffs and taking other steps to open markets were seen as necessary to spur
economic growth. Cordell Hull was prominently associated with this view.3 At the
same time, there was a strong interest, expressed by John Maynard Keynes, amongst
others, in preserving a welfare state, especially in ensuring full employment.4
In Ruggie’s article, the Embedded Liberalism Compromise refers to the postWorld War Two/Bretton Woods-era middle ground between the liberal economic
orthodoxy of open markets and the policy goals underpinning the discriminatory
trade and monetary practices of the interwar years. Ruggie explains that ‘[t]his was
the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of
the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon
domestic interventionism.’5 Ruggie identiﬁes efforts to join multilateralism with
‘collaboration to assure domestic economic growth and social security’ as appearing
as early as the 1941 Atlantic Charter.6 The Compromise in many ways was between
the United States, standing nearly alone in favour of multilateral trade liberalisation
and with a particular interest in non-discrimination in trade and foreign exchange,
and the other Allies, led by the United Kingdom, who favoured various forms of
‘domestic interventionism’.7 But more fundamentally, it was a ‘middle way’, (a term

2

3

4
5
6
7

See, e.g., B. Eichengreen, ‘The political economy of the Smoot–Hawley tariff’ (working paper
no. w2001, NBER, 2001). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269524.
See, e.g., K. W. Dam, ‘Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the WTO’,
(working paper series no. 228, John M. Olin Law & Economics, 2004). https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=604582.
See, especially, J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).
Ruggie, note 1, 393.
Ibid., 394.
Ibid., 393.
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used by Keynes) between the prevailing policies of the nineteenth century of laissezfaire liberalism and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, Marxism.8
The Compromise, as Ruggie explained in a subsequent essay, took different forms
in different countries,
[but] the underlying idea was the same: a grand social bargain whereby all sectors of
society agreed to open markets, which in some cases had become heavily administered if not autarchic in the 1930s, but also to contain and share the social
adjustment costs that open markets inevitably produce. That was the essence of
the embedded liberalism compromise: economic liberalization was embedded in
social community.9

In the context of the GATT, the Compromise entailed coupling multilateral
commitments to reducing certain trade barriers with the broad freedom to undertake domestic practices to maintain economic stability. In other words, even more
important than economic growth was an overarching goal of international stability,
which, it was felt, could not be guaranteed in the absence of the ability for countries
to ensure high levels of domestic employment.10 The speciﬁc steps taken in given
countries varied, but governments broadly implemented the Compromise, liberalising their markets on a multilateral basis while taking steps to ensure monetary
stability and social investments and safety nets.11
The countries involved in the Bretton Woods talks were primarily developed
countries with market economies,12 and for these countries the Embedded Liberalism Compromise was a success: ‘this grand bargain formed the basis of the longest
and most equitable economic expansion in human history’.13 The Cold War likely
also helped bring these countries together.14 Embedded Liberalism was also consistent with the US’s post-war efforts to effect (through, inter alia, the Marshall Plan and
the New Deal) political stability through economic growth.

8

9

10

11
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13
14

J. Kirshner, “Keynes, capital mobility and the crisis of Embedded Liberalism,” Review of
International Political Economy 6 (1999): 313, 317.
J. G. Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism global: The corporate connection,” in D. Held
and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Polity Press,
2003) 93–94.
A. Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Re-Imagining the Global Economic Order
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 196.
Ruggie, note 9, 93–94.
The GATT’s twenty-three original signatories comprised: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, France, India, Lebanon,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South
Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Ruggie, note 9, 94.
See, e.g., R. S. Kroszner and D. A. Irwin, “Interests, institutions, and ideology in securing
policy change: The Republican conversion to trade liberalization after Smoot–Hawley,”
Journal of Law and Economics XLII (1999): 643, 654 (discussing the link between anticommunist sentiment and more openness to free trade policies).
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the embedded liberalism compromise in the gatt
The Embedded Liberalism Compromise can be seen throughout the original
GATT text, beginning with its preamble, which provides:
Recognizing that their relations in the ﬁeld of trade and economic endeavour should
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange
of goods,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce,
Have through their Representatives agreed as follows . . .15

Recalling that the Compromise marries international commitments to liberalise
trade with the granting of policy space to undertake domestic measures to ensure
stability, particularly of employment, this section ﬁrst discusses the trade-liberalising
components of the GATT and then identiﬁes the major sources of policy space for
signatories to act domestically.

Trade Liberalisation
The GATT drafters prioritised making trade barriers more transparent by requiring
quotas and other quantitative restrictions to be exchanged in favour of tariffs and
treating signatories on an equal and reciprocal basis to enhance stability.16 Thus, the
GATT text included the following requirements. It imposed a requirement of mostfavoured nation treatment, meaning that GATT signatories could not apply favouritism in the tariffs or other trade advantages provided to one or more GATT
signatories but, instead, had to treat every signatory with the best treatment offered
to any other signatory.17 It also required that signatories create tariff schedules
comprising bound tariff rates that would constitute tariff ceilings, that applied tariff
rates would be applied on an MFN basis to all signatories and that tariffs would be
negotiated downwards over time.18 GATT also imposed a national treatment obligation, prohibiting any signatory from giving better treatment to domestic products in
the form of internal taxes or regulations than it provided to like-imported products.19
The general elimination of quantitative restrictions was also imposed,20 and any
15
16
17
18
19
20

GATT, Preamble.
Lang, note 10, 197.
GATT, Article I.
GATT, Article II.
GATT, Article III.
GATT, Article XI.
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permitted quantitative restrictions were to be administered on a non-discriminatory
basis.21 Border barriers associated with goods in transit,22 customs valuation,23
customs fees and formalities,24 and the imposition of foreign marks of origin were
to be disciplined to avoid abuse and ensure reciprocity.25 Trade regulations were
required to be published and to be administered in a fair and transparent manner.26
Foreign exchange restrictions were only to be taken consistent with the determinations of the International Monetary Fund.27 Importantly, there would be a process,
albeit a highly diplomatic one, to address disputes.28

Domestic Policy Space/Exceptions
While the above commitments enshrined in the GATT were, and remain, highly
signiﬁcant and important, there are a breadth and depth of exceptions – either in the
form of textual provisions, omissions of coverage or non-enforcement of stated
obligations – that offered substantial policy space for signatories to take domestic
actions to ensure domestic stability.
These include:
1. That very few agricultural or textiles tariff lines were bound; agricultural
products were not subject to GATT tariff reduction negotiations and
agriculture was exempted from several commitments;29
2. Remaining able, within parameters, to adopt balance of payments measures and assist infant industries;30
3. Exceptions permitting quantitative restrictions if there were a threat to
monetary reserves;31
4. Provisions enabling certain preferential arrangements to remain in
place;32

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32

GATT, Article XIII.
GATT, Article V.
GATT, Article VII.
GATT, Article VIII.
GATT, Article IX.
GATT, Article X.
GATT, Article XV.
GATT, Articles XXII and XXIII.
These exceptions include GATT Article XI:2, which permits quantitative restrictions on
agricultural and ﬁsheries products under certain circumstances, and GATT Article XVI:3,
which discourages but leaves open the use of export subsidies for primary products.
GATT, Articles XII and XVIII.
GATT, Article XII:3(d).
E.g., GATT, Article I:2–4.
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5. General exceptions provisions to permit deviations from the core
GATT obligations in order to, inter alia, preference domestic priorities
such as health and safety;33
6. Security exceptions that appear to be self-executing;34
7. Authorisation to subsidise and adopt countervailing measures,35 impose
anti-dumping duties36 and utilise safeguard measures;37
8. The possibility of waiver or renegotiation of commitments;38
9. The ability of individual signatories to decline to extend tariff concessions or other GATT entitlements to new signatories;39
10. Limited exceptions permitting customs unions and free trade agreements, drafted so as to keep multilateralism the norm but to ensure the
compatibility with GATT of nascent European groupings; 40 and
11. A system of dispute resolution based on diplomacy and pragmatism
rather than strict adherence to legal text; this – and the consensus rule –
enabled adjudicators to opine in ways that were sometimes opaque but
which left room for different outcomes depending on the needs of the
parties and for the signatories to form a ‘community opinion’ with
respect to the panel report conclusions.41,42

the gatt years – embedded liberalism
or something else?
The Early GATT Years – Embedded Liberalism Flourishes
In the ﬁfteen years or so following the formation of the GATT, the Embedded
Liberalism Compromise continued and even expanded. During the ﬁrst GATT
trade rounds, the focus was on negotiating bilateral tariff reductions, but agriculture
and textiles remained mostly excluded. Gradually, these sectors were given consideration but generally in terms of managing markets so as to maintain domestic stability
and predictable apportioning of any market opening.

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42

GATT, Article XX.
GATT, Article XXI.
GATT, Articles VI and XVI.
GATT, Article VI.
GATT, Article XIX.
GATT, Articles XXV and XXVIII; see also Lang, note 10, 197.
GATT, Article XXXV.
GATT, Article XXIV.
In the GATT era, dispute settlement reports were only adopted and, therefore, binding on the
parties to the given dispute if there was a consensus of the signatories – including the losing
party – to adopt the report.
Lang, note 10, 204–205.
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With respect to agriculture, post-war food shortages led to strong voices in favour
of protection.43 European countries agreed in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to create
the Common Agricultural Policy – a complex scheme involving signiﬁcant market
interventions and substantial ﬁnancial support for domestic farmers – that ‘was
central to the political compromise that led to the creation of peace in Europe’.44
Textiles grew in sensitivity in the post-war years. While the founding GATT
signatories were primarily developed and not in a position to ﬂood each other’s
markets with inexpensive textiles, Japan’s entry into the GATT in 1955 changed the
dynamics, as did other factors that contributed to a great supply of cheap textiles on
international markets and difﬁculties in keeping those products at bay.45 A number
of GATT signatories invoked Article XXXV and declined to open their markets to
Japan, in large part due to fears over textiles.46 In addition, two ‘Arrangements’ were
negotiated, one in 1961 and another which replaced it in 1962, each of which
controlled trade in cotton textiles by allowing quantitative restrictions to be imposed
on imports.47 Although these agreements were inconsistent with GATT, the participants did not seek a waiver.48 This behaviour is consistent with what Lang characterises as informal norms in the WTO taking precedence over the formal texts. Lang
explains that the norms applicable in the early GATT years were only partly derived
from the text of the Agreement, and were signiﬁcantly derived from a prevailing
philosophy or ‘common sense’ amongst the diplomats, many of whom were involved
in the Agreement’s drafting. They understood that some provisions were not meant
to be enforced strictly, while other provisions were seen as having more primacy.49
These interventions were coupled with sustained economic growth in developed
market economies. Thus, for a period of time up until at least the early 1960s, the
Embedded Liberalism Compromise appeared to demonstrate the wisdom of linking
economic growth mechanisms with domestic state interventions.50

When Was the Beginning of the End?
While commentators seem to agree Embedded Liberalism was still widely accepted
as of the beginning of the Kennedy Round, the timing of its decline is harder to
43

44
45

46
47
48
49
50

A. Orford, “Food security, free trade, and the battle for the state,” Journal of International Law
and International Relations 11, no. 2 (2015): 1, 52.
Ibid., 53.
See S. Lester, ‘The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, in P. F. J. Macrory et al. (eds.), The
World Trade Organization: Legal, Political and Economic Analysis, Vol. 1 (Springer, 2005) 413.
Ibid., 413.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Lang, note 10, 202–203.
S. Pitruzzello, “Trade liberalization, economic performance, and social protection: Nineteenth century British laissez-faire and post–World War II US-embedded liberalism,” International Organization 58 (2004): 705, 710.
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pinpoint and should probably be viewed as a progression that occurred over a
lengthy period. Lang contends that the shared vision began to fall away by the
mid-1960s, with the formation of the European Economic Community in the late
1950s ushering in new challenges, along with the aforementioned ascendancy of
Japan and the entry of other developing countries.51 By contrast, while acknowledging changes and challenges, Ruggie considered the Embedded Liberalism Compromise to be intact at the time his article was published in 1982.
Fundamentally, the Compromise was at its most stable when the GATT comprised relatively homogenous signatories – predominantly developed, and mostly
market, economies. The foundational principle of reciprocity took a hit with the
formation of the EEC but even more so by the inﬂux of developing countries and
the resulting addition of Part IV on Trade and Development to the GATT in 1965.
As Ruggie has conceded, ‘[t]he compromise of embedded liberalism has never been
fully extended to the developing countries’.52
Regardless of the precise beginnings of the end, GATT signatories took a number
of steps in the 1960s and 1970s that suggest a push and pull with respect to
Embedded Liberalism – in some instances undermining the original principles
and in others appearing to bolster them.53
GATT signatories took a further protective step with respect to textiles in the 1970s
that was consistent with an enduring Embedded Liberalism ethos. They did so by
negotiating the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which covered a broader array of
textiles and created a highly managed system within which countries could, inter
alia, restrain imports to enable ‘the orderly and equitable development of this trade
and avoidance of disruptive effects in individual markets. . .’.54 The MFA remained
in force until 1994 and, like the earlier textiles agreements, seemed to be GATTinconsistent, though no waiver was sought nor challenges launched.55
At the same time, the 1970s brought challenges, including the abandonment of
the gold standard and stagﬂation. The beginnings of neo-liberal policies emerged,
alongside increased measures to restrain trade that went beyond those explicitly
permitted by GATT Articles XII and XIX. GATT signatories simply took matters into
their own hands and, when faced with a perceived need for increased government
intervention, developed creative ways of so doing, such as ‘voluntary’ export
restraints and orderly market arrangements.56 Were these developments a continuation of Embedded Liberalism or a repudiation?

51
52
53
54
55
56

Lang, note 10, 217.
Ruggie, note 1, 413.
Lang, note 10, 222.
Multi-Fiber Arrangement 1974, Article 1.2; Lester, note 45, 414.
Lester, note 45, 414.
Ruggie, note 1, 411.
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For Ruggie, signatories’ tolerance for this rule bending illustrated the vitality of
the Embedded Liberalism principle.57 However, as Lang notes, the economic
challenges of the 1970s soured many on the underpinnings of Embedded Liberalism, leading to the resurgence of interest in policies more akin to the laissez-faire
economic liberalism of the nineteenth century.58 This ‘neo-liberalism’ had as its
priorities allowing markets to function unfettered and encouraging conditions
conducive to wealth creation and private investment.59 Within this mindset, the
most signiﬁcant problem was inﬂation, with much less interest in the Embedded
Liberalism priorities of economic stability and maximising employment and with
little support for protectionist measures aimed at supporting those priorities.60
Lang argues that the Tokyo Round outcomes reﬂect a compromise between the
priorities of Embedded Liberalism and those of neo-liberalism.61 Notwithstanding
growing calls for an abandonment of Keynesian policies, Ruggie felt that Embedded
Liberalism would ‘endure as a central institutional feature of the international
economic order’ so long as it was understood that divorcing economic theory from
social policy would result in even worse outcomes.62 Nonetheless, at the time of the
article’s publication in 1982, Embedded Liberalism was under attack and neoliberalism was gaining momentum.63
The 1980s ushered in a decided turn away from managed economic strictures and
towards neo-liberalism. In the international economic arena, this turn was reﬂected,
inter alia, in the Washington Consensus: the expanding of the international trade
agenda to address more non-tariff and behind-the-border measures and the shift in
GATT dispute settlement towards more technical, formalistic interpretations,
including the demise of the ‘aims and effects’ test.
However, the phenomenon of incorporating certain types of domestic regulatory
policy space into trade agreements has continued, and one could argue that the
inclusion of such provisions reﬂects Embedded Liberalism in a new guise. Indeed,
other chapters in this volume use the term Embedded Liberalism to refer to modern
international decision-making along these lines.
Is it appropriate or desirable to use the terms ‘Embedded Liberalism’ and
‘Embedded Liberalism Compromise’ to characterise trade agreement provisions
after the 1970s? In other words, should these terms be seen as inherently ﬁxed and
limited to the time period discussed by Ruggie, or should they be stretched, like the

57

58
59
60
61
62
63

Ibid., 411 and n. 97, the latter discussing G. and V. Curzon, “The management of trade
relations in the GATT,” in A. Shonﬁeld (ed.), International Economic Relations of the Western
World 1959–1971, Vol. 1 (1976), 222.
Lang, note 10, 222.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ruggie, note 1, 415 and n. 109.
Pitruzzello, note 50, 710–711.
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accordion of likeness,64 to encompass different forms of compromise between
competing trade and non-trade objectives? Regardless of what ‘should’ be the case,
commentators have often used these terms in ways that appear to differ from
Ruggie’s original conception. For example, Wolfe argues that the Uruguay Round
agreements intended, in the form of the Agriculture Agreement, to extend the
Embedded Liberalism concept to agriculture.65 While the Agriculture Agreement
arguably reﬂects a balance between trade liberalisation and domestic policy space,
the space being preserved was not necessarily related to prioritising full employment,
and different cohorts of negotiating countries would have preferred less, more or
different types of policy space. Similarly, Ehrlich characterises Ruggie’s thesis as
being that governments can generate domestic support for free trade policies if they
compensate the losers from trade, such as through welfare or education policies.66
This seems more like a rationale based in domestic policy rather than multilateral
consensus. Even Ruggie himself seems to apply his concept in more expansive terms
in his later writings, referring to non-trade values such as ‘social community’ rather
than focusing on full employment.
Whether or not we label it Embedded Liberalism, it is clear that international
trade negotiations have continued to include provisions that are not aimed at market
access but, rather, at other priorities. In some instances, such provisions may be in
the spirit of the policies pursued in the post-war Bretton Woods era and should
perhaps be seen as a continuation of the original Embedded Liberalism Compromise. In other cases, the inclusion of non-trade-enhancing provisions does not appear
to be driven by the same or even analogous concerns of Hull, Keynes and their
colleagues. In these circumstances, we could characterise such provisions as a new
form of Embedded Liberalism or give them another name.67 The phenomenon of
balancing trade and non-trade objectives remains a constant, but we can perhaps
distinguish amongst the motivations for such provisions, so as to describe them in a
manner that limits confusion. The next part uses a number of examples from the
GATT Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds to assess these more recent agreement features.

64

65

66

67

Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (“Japan – Alcoholic Beverages
II ”), WT/DS8/AB/R, 21, (4 October 1996), in which the Appellate Body determined that the
term ‘like’ does not have a ﬁxed meaning but should be interpreted more narrowly or broadly
depending on the provision in which it appears.
R. Wolfe, Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime
(London: Macmillan, 1998) 134 as discussed in G. Skogstad, “The international trade regime:
Liberalism and embedded liberalism,” Journal of International Law and International Relations 11, no. 2 (2015): 147, 151.
S. D. Ehrlich, “The fair trade challenge to embedded liberalism,” International Studies
Quarterly 54, no. 4 (2010): 1013.
See, e.g., R. B. Bilder and D. M. Trubek, “Book review of J. S. Nye Jr. and J. D. Donahue
(eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World (Brookings, 2000),” American Journal of International Law 96 (2002): 748, 749 (discussing the need for a new vision if Embedded Liberalism
is to be ‘reinvented’).
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non-trade objectives in the tokyo and uruguay rounds:
embedded liberalism or not?
In Ruggie’s original Embedded Liberalism article, the provision of policy space to
promote domestic stability via high levels of employment reﬂected a shared policy
goal amongst the negotiators rather than a trade-off or the result of compromise or
contestation. In the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, while we see a continuation of
measures that are designed to fulﬁl objectives other than trade liberalisation, it is
rarely the case that such measures reﬂect a uniﬁed conception of policy objectives
that include prioritising full employment. Instead, in many cases, such provisions
seem to be the result of some form of negotiation or horse trading, with some
preferring such measures not be included at all and others perhaps preferring an
even stronger version and with an array of motivations for including various types of
domestic policy space.
Throughout much of the GATT era, the signatories accepted and indeed negotiated various forms of market-share management schemes. These included orderly
marketing arrangements (OMAs), voluntary export restraints (VERs), voluntary
restraint agreements (VRAs), the Long-Term Textile Agreement (1962), the MultiFibre Arrangement, the International Dairy Arrangement (1979) (which established
minimum export prices for certain dairy products) and the Arrangement Regarding
Bovine Meat (1979).68,69 In general, these practices allowed countries (primarily
developed) to shield their producers from the full force of international competition.
To the extent free markets would have driven some companies to downsize or shut
down, these measures could be viewed as promoting employment or stability more
generally and, thus, are broadly consistent with the Embedded Liberalism Compromise. We can see signs of Embedded Liberalism in some of the language used in
these texts.
In the 1973 Declaration that launched the Tokyo Round, the Ministers did not
mention full employment or other objectives of particular interest to developed
countries but did indicate that trade liberalisation should be balanced against the
needs of developing countries. Perhaps the clearest reﬂection of an Embedded
Liberalism approach, however, lies in a provision urging a monetary system to
ensure ‘orderly conditions’: ‘The policy of liberalizing world trade cannot be carried
out successfully in the absence of parallel efforts to set up a monetary system which
shields the world economy from the shocks and imbalances which have previously
occurred. The Ministers will not lose sight of the fact that the efforts which are to be
68

69

This was a plurilateral arrangement that came into force in 1980 and was incorporated into the
WTO upon its creation, renamed as the International Dairy Agreement in 1994. The Agreement was terminated in 1997.
The International Bovine Meat Agreement was a plurilateral arrangement that came into force
in 1980 and was incorporated into the WTO upon its creation, renamed as the International
Bovine Meat Agreement in 1994. The Agreement was terminated in 1997.
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made in the trade ﬁeld imply continuing efforts to maintain orderly conditions and
to establish a durable and equitable monetary system.’70
Similarly, although a relatively late agreement, the preamble to the Arrangement
Regarding Bovine Meat and the International Bovine Meat Agreement that took its
place (this language is the same) arguably reﬂects a form of Embedded Liberalism.
Its ﬁrst three paragraphs state, inter alia, that: ‘increased international cooperation
should be carried out in such a way as to contribute to the achievement of greater
liberalization, stability and expansion’; ‘[t]aking into account the need to avoid
serious disturbances in international trade in bovine meat and live animals’; and
‘Recognizing the importance of production and trade in bovine meat and live
animals for the economies of many countries, especially for certain developed and
developing countries.’71
The very notion of Codes in the Tokyo Round could be seen as reﬂecting
Embedded Liberalism – or as repudiating it. On the one hand, the creation of
Codes was in tension with the notions of multilateralism and reciprocity that were so
highly valued at the GATT’s creation and in the original conception of Embedded
Liberalism. It reﬂects more divergence of interests and a lack of universally shared
values. On the other hand, this ‘club of clubs’ practice provided a degree of domestic
policy autonomy because signatories could pick and choose amongst these new
agreements, while still remaining a part of the GATT writ large.72 When viewed in
contrast with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which saw participants having
to choose to be ‘all in’ or ‘all out’ and no longer able to have their cake and eat it too,
the Codes could be seen as an evolved form of Embedded Liberalism.

The Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round, of course, culminated in the formation of the World Trade
Organization. These negotiations reﬂected a vastly different set of parties and
priorities to those in place to negotiate the GATT. While each successive GATT
round included more developing country participants than the round before, this
did not necessarily impact the negotiating agenda as fully as it could have. In
particular, the practice of ‘GATT a la carte’,73 utilised ﬁrst with the Kennedy Round
Anti-dumping Code and subsequently with a series of Codes in the Tokyo Round,
allowed signatories to pick and choose their commitments with respect to the
Rounds’ negotiating outcomes. The Uruguay Round departed from this practice,
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not only by establishing a ‘single undertaking’ tying together all of the disparate
negotiations temporally (nothing is agreed until everything is agreed) but also, once
the decision was taken to form the WTO, by conditioning WTO accession on
acceptance of the full package of Uruguay Round agreements.74 Therefore, no
longer could members opt out of agreements without abandoning the whole. If,
for example, a developing country was not willing to be party to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services or the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Agreement, it could not be a member of the WTO.
The Uruguay Round and resulting WTO Agreements also represented a retreat
from the Embedded Liberalism Compromise in numerous other ways. Here, I offer
but a few examples. First, the formation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
with its reverse consensus model for adopting reports, represented a formalisation of
the more technocratic, legalistic turn that had already occurred in practice amongst
GATT panels in the later years. This change was nonetheless signiﬁcant: whereas,
in the GATT era, parties could elect to block the adoption of panel reports that went
against them and the membership as a whole could exercise discretion in agreeing
or withholding agreement with respect to adopting reports, that discretion was all
lost with the creation of the WTO. The dispute settlement system is an example of
stronger international rules and a weakening of domestic policy space. Under the
GATT, because a losing party could block the adoption of a panel report, there were
few cases where a panel report was adopted but the losing party did not comply with
the report. In contrast, since the formation of the WTO, all reports are adopted
(because adoption occurs unless all members, including the prevailing party to the
dispute, agree it should not be adopted), including ones that require a change of
some sort to a politically sensitive domestic practice. As a result, a small number of
reports have not been complied with. In place of the GATT’s diplomatic approach,
members may now choose to ‘up the ante’ and seek a compliance proceeding to
adjudicate the loser’s non-compliance, followed by pursuing permission to suspend
concessions – that is, to retaliate for that non-compliance. Thus, instead of disputes
being resolved by the consensus of the members, including the loser, under the
WTO the loser may stand alone and face consequences for its failure to comply with
the panel’s report.
Second, the GATT left signiﬁcant policy space for members to protect domestic
interests, only interfering if the purpose of such interventions was protectionist. The
WTO agreements have eroded some of that policy space through new obligations
and more of it by enforcing the existing obligations pursuant to more of a technical
legal structure than one in which results were legitimised through diplomatic
consensus.75
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Third, the Uruguay Round ushered in new commitments that are in tension with
an Embedded Liberalism approach. These include reductions in policy space
through new substantive obligations, as well as through the new dispute settlement
system. The new obligations that have reduced policy space include the Safeguards
Agreement, which prohibits the types of non-transparent market-managing agreements, including OMAs and VERs, that were so prevalent in the 1970s; the TRIPS
Agreement, which requires intellectual property consumers and poor countries,
amongst others, to protect intellectual property to a minimum threshold; and the
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures Agreement, which is in part intended to
discipline the use of the precautionary principle. The new Dispute Settlement
Understanding also reduced members’ domestic policy autonomy. Whereas, previously, panel reports had been adopted by consensus and therefore required the
losing party’s acquiescence, the DSU’s system of reverse consensus took away the
ability of a member to block the adoption of a report. Further, the DSU provisions
aimed at effecting compliance ensure that failure to comply comes with the risk of
retaliation – and decisions on such matters are made pursuant to a more technical,
legalistic framework than the diplomatic, consensus-driven mechanisms of the early
GATT years.

the current context – the wto era
The WTO is now over twenty years old, and no new multilateral round of trade
negotiations has been concluded. That fact alone suggests that the WTO membership is not uniﬁed behind common objectives and methodologies; the details
support that conclusion. With free trade agreements having proliferated for the past
ﬁfteen years or more, the value of reciprocity has been severely diminished. Over ten
years ago, commentators were already characterising MFN as ‘LFN’ (for leastfavoured nation) because the vast majority of WTO members get better than
MFN treatment from most developed country members.76 The combination of
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Generalized System of Preferences schemes, other
Enabling Clause arrangements and preferences authorised by waiver have created
hundreds of relationships that provide better than MFN treatment.77
In addition, members have not been able to agree on much at the negotiating
table. There is little urgency to conclude the Doha Development Round and the
gaps in positions seem insuperable. There is an increasing divide between developed
and higher-level developing countries on the one hand and least- and less-developed
developing countries on the other. The former are creating ever more and larger
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trade agreements outside the multilateral framework, but these mega-regionals and
plurilateral agreements largely exclude weaker economies. This reﬂects the preferences of both developed and less-developed countries. The developed countries
want to pursue their priorities without having to dilute them or provide something in
exchange for the acquiescence of developing countries. At the same time, many
developing countries do not have an interest in acceding to the types of commitments being agreed to in mega-regionals and plurilateral trade agreements. For
example, while some more export-oriented developing countries have been keen to
join the TPP, for less-developed countries, and particularly LDCs, provisions such as
TRIPS+ intellectual property protections, binding labour and environmental chapters and restrictions on state-owned enterprises are a non-starter. Thus, these agreements are not so much an effort by developed countries to shut out developing ones
but, rather, a case of developed countries pursuing their objectives, which are not
shared by many developing countries. This, again, illustrates the lack of common
interests and objectives within the WTO membership as a whole.
Furthermore, less-developed countries have been digging in their heels in some
cases to insist that the developed countries not be able to impose their wishes upon
them any further. The backdrop to this posture is that, in the Uruguay Round,
developed countries sought cooperation from developing countries to agree to
TRIPS and GATS, amongst other provisions, which developing countries did not
see as being in their interests. The developing countries were told ‘the next round
will be for you’ and based in part on that assurance, agreed to the Uruguay Round
agreements and became charter members of the World Trade Organization. However, the promise has not come to fruition, and developing countries have increasingly felt disillusioned by the failure of developed countries to make good on their
promises. Although the current round of WTO negotiations is called the Doha
Development Round, so-titled to emphasise that the focus would be on developing
country issues, the name has not been sufﬁcient to impel the developed country
WTO members to conclude the round. Indeed, there does not appear to be an ethos
of ‘owing’ the developing countries or otherwise a sense of obligation to follow
through with the assurances of the 1990s.
The shift away from Embedded Liberalism cuts across developed and developing
countries in the context of Article XXIV’s evolution. The original signatories were
committed to equality on a multilateral basis and did not anticipate many FTAs or
customs unions would come into existence, and this expectation was borne out for
most of the GATT’s history. Only a small number of FTAs were entered into during
the Uruguay Round, including the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
New Zealand–Australia Free Trade Agreement (later renamed Closer Economic
Relations). However, after the WTO entered into force, the traditional process of
negotiating new liberalisation through rounds broke down. First, members could
not agree on a negotiating agenda at the Singapore Ministerial (with developing
countries objecting to the inclusion of topics such as investment, which were
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favoured by many developed countries); then the Seattle Ministerial failed to launch
the planned Millennium Round; and, thereafter, the Doha Development Round
launched but sixteen years later shows no signs of drawing to a conclusion. The
failure of the multilateral negotiating mechanism to produce results, coupled with
an implicit acceptance by WTO members of their inability to enforce GATT Article
XXIV, led WTO members to negotiate FTAs – many of which were of dubious
quality – by the hundreds. The Embedded Liberalism notion of all being part of the
same club and applying the same treatment to all fellow club members has well and
truly been abandoned.

Is There Any Embedded Liberalism to Be Found?
To be sure, Embedded Liberalism in its original guise is difﬁcult to ﬁnd anymore
and has been for a number of decades. At the same time, neo-liberalism is no longer
popular – indeed, there have been numerous populist successes in recent years that
suggest broad dissatisfaction with neo-liberal policies. To the extent recent international economic agreements have incorporated priorities and values other than
opening markets, these could be considered a modiﬁed form of Embedded Liberalism – or something else.
For example, one could argue that the food security outcomes from the 2013 Bali
Ministerial and 2015 Nairobi Ministerial represent a form of embedded liberalism.78
The agreement at the Nairobi Ministerial to cease agricultural export subsidies
could be viewed similarly.79
A more cynical view would be that the recent Ministerials (and indeed the
Uruguay Round agreements) reﬂect a give-and-take wherein developed countries
are giving concessions to developing countries in exchange for the latter’s acquiescence in the developed country agenda, rather than any sort of a shared collective
view regarding a best approach. The enduring adherence to special and differential
treatment could also be seen either way – perhaps it reﬂects common values
regarding appropriate trade-offs, but it could also be a more mercantilist concession
in exchange for buy-in to a developed country agenda.
Within trade, there may be more evidence of embedded liberalism-type decisionmaking outside the WTO context. Examples include the EU’s efforts to maintain
special and non-reciprocal relationships with the ACP countries; the EU practice of
including human rights provisions in its FTAs; GSP schemes that are broad in scope
and limited in conditions and the agreements negotiated by ASEAN, which integrate assistance and different timelines for its less-developed members.
Ironically, the strongest evidence of an evolved form of Embedded Liberalism in
international economic law may lie in an arena excluded from its original
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inception – international investment. Possible indicia include the tobacco carveout
in the CPTPP text, as well as the widespread reconsideration of Investor–State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and the view that ISDS provisions should preserve an
amount of policy space.80 The contours of the amount are not necessarily universally agreed to, but there does seem to be a growing consensus that ISDS provisions
must not stand in the way of countries adopting measures such as tobacco plain
packaging to protect health.81

What Does the Future Hold?
Calls to abandon the single undertaking and to formalise a system of ‘variable
geometry’ within the WTO pursuant to which members would have to follow
certain core WTO principles but would otherwise be permitted to opt out of joining
particular agreements in which they would prefer not to participate82 could be seen
as being sympathetic to Embedded Liberalism. While variable geometry would be a
retreat from complete reciprocity, there has not been full reciprocity between
developing and developed countries for over ﬁfty years. A variable geometry
approach would, however, lessen the pressures on certain WTO members to go
along with the agenda of a small number of developed countries. It could, perhaps,
lead to a return to the mindset of the early GATT years, when those who were
negotiating had similar interests and values. By allowing WTO members to opt out
of certain agreements, those with shared objectives would, in theory, again be able to
work together with less need to compromise with disinterested or objecting
members. Many of the signatories to the original GATT may still have some
collective, shared, non-trade-driven values, but these cannot easily rise to the fore
in the multilateral context due to the substantial increase in the membership by
developing countries. The increase in plurilateral and mega-regional trade negotiations is a development that is consistent with the variable geometry mindset and, as
such, could also be seen as a development that is consistent with Embedded
Liberalism. In these negotiations, the ‘club’ is generally pursuing relatively open
markets but, at the same time, is ‘locking in’ the policy space to undertake certain
domestic measures and protections – those that match the political economy needs
of the participants’ domestic constituencies.
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To return to the question raised above, should we view plurilateral trade agreements and calls for variable geometry as Embedded Liberalism? On the one hand,
the negotiations developed countries wish to pursue and the nature of the protective
measures they wish to include in mega-regional and plurilateral FTAs differ from
the objectives and sensitivities of 1947. So, if what we mean by ‘Embedded Liberalism’ is a trade-off to pursue growth while allowing policy space to effect full
employment, then these modern-day developments are not Embedded Liberalism.
On the other hand, if we intend for ‘Embedded Liberalism’ to be a shorthand for a
balancing of trade liberalisation with policy space to pursue shared domestic objectives, then perhaps modern developments are salient to the discussion.
This idea, as explored in Ehrlich and sources therein, can be contrasted with the
populist rhetoric from the 2016 presidential campaigns, in which there was no effort
by Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump, and only minimal discussion by Hillary
Clinton, to argue that trade is on balance a positive, with the caveat that steps need
to be taken to help the losers. Instead, the overwhelming message was that trade
agreements are bad, and the solution for the losers is that we stop entering into trade
agreements and abandon those we already have. Of all the candidates who gained
any traction in the 2016 campaign, John Kasich may have been the only one who
was unapologetically free trade. Other candidates that expressed broad support for
trade (including Jeb Bush) were all forced to drop out very early in the primary
process by which each party’s candidate is selected.
The populist wave exempliﬁed by Brexit, the election of President Trump, the
unexpected popularity of Bernie Sanders and the Wallonian protests over CETA
could all, therefore, be seen as a growing consensus internationally in favour of a
return to some form of Embedded Liberalism. However, there is a gap between
where we are now and where the allies were in the post-war period. In the 1940s, the
allies were strongly in favour of removing trade barriers, albeit while preserving
domestic policy space. Today’s populists may object to trade and investment agreements on the basis that they provide inadequate space to regulate, but there is no
collective appetite for negotiating down the existing barriers to market access.
Instead, we are increasingly seeing calls for the domestic policy space to be used
to improve the lot of larger swathes of the population without the ‘compromise’ of
opening markets in the ﬁrst place.

conclusion
Much like a work of art that different viewers may interpret in a variety of ways,
commentators have used the term Embedded Liberalism in contexts that may not
have been contemplated by Ruggie in 1982. Some may feel that ‘Embedded
Liberalism’ should only be used to refer to the Compromise as it existed in the
Bretton Woods negotiations and the drafting of the GATT in 1947, while others will
see the term as an evolutionary one that can be applied to new situations and
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dynamics. Regardless of the terminology one chooses to apply to the dynamics
occurring in different time periods, there seem to be a few conclusions with which
we could perhaps all agree. First, the Embedded Liberalism Compromise, in the
sense of the 1940s mindset described in Ruggie’s 1982 article, disappeared by the
beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations and was on the decline for many
years before that. Second, while few governments have been pushing for unfettered
free trade, there are signiﬁcant differences between the policy space that has been
sought by developed countries and that sought by developing countries. Third,
while the WTO membership is unlikely to agree any time soon on a comprehensive
approach towards balancing liberalisation with domestic policy space, there are
developments within international economic law that are reminiscent of Embedded
Liberalism. However, the different priorities and political imperatives within
developed and developing countries suggest that any Embedded Liberalism 2.0 will
not look like the original and will have less comprehensive buy-in. This may be as
much attributed to the WTO’s vastly more diverse and numerous WTO membership compared to the GATT, as it can be to any decline in common priorities
amongst similarly situated economies.

